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I. Introduction
A. Scope
The memorandum discusses whether Lebanon and other States are obligated under Chapter
VII of the UN Security Council to cooperate with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.* The
memorandum approaches this question by first providing a factual and detailed background of
STL’s creation, its implementing Security Council Resolution, and applicable legal issues. Next,
the memorandum analyzes the powers and limitations of the Security Council, and methods for
interpreting Security Council Resolutions. The memorandum then interprets the text of Security
Council Resolution 1757 to (1) determine the legal status of Resolution 1757’s attached
documents, and (2) address whether States are obligated to cooperate with the STL. Finally the
memorandum examines Security Council Resolution 1373 and its impact on the obligations of
States to the STL.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The STL Represents a Chapter VII Established International Tribunal.
The Security Council’s Chapter VII powers have greatly expanded in the post-Cold War era.
While the Security Council cannot violate general principles of international law or the UN
Charter, the Security Council’s are by and large unreviewable. By following past practice and
not violating the UN Charter or international law, the STL represents a legitimate exercise of the
Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.
2. There Exist No Codified Rules to Guide the Interpretation of Security
Council Resolutions.
While proposed methods to interpret Security Council resolutions have been given by the
International Court of Justice, international tribunals, and international law experts, the rules of
7

Security Council Resolution interpretation remain unsettled. One interpretive approach that has
emerged, however, is that—unlike treaties—the Council’s preparatory work (travaux) plays a
primary role in interpreting the Security Council’s Chapter VII resolutions.
3. The STL Represents a Chapter VII Created Tribunal.
Similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the STL and its governing documents were
established by the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers. While a competing establishment
theory exists in the case of the STL, only direct Chapter VII establishment conforms to principles
of international law. As such, the STL should not be viewed as a treaty-based tribunal, such as
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (EEEC) or the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL).
4. Security Resolution 1757 Imposes an Obligation on Lebanon to
Cooperate with the STL.
The Chapter VII Authority of Resolution 1757 carries over into its attached documents. Article
15 of the annexed agreement therefore obligates Lebanon to cooperate with the STL.
5. A Persuasive Argument Exists that Resolution 1757 Obligates Third
Party States to Cooperate with the STL.
When viewed in conjunction with Security Council Resolution 1373, Security Council
Resolution 1757 imposes an implied obligation for all States to cooperate with the STL.
Resolution 1373 imposes a general obligation for states to cooperate with the prosecution of
perpetrators of terrorist acts. Resolution 1757 triggers this obligation by (1) declaring a defined
terrorist act and (2) establishing a clear method of justice to prosecute the perpetrators of the
February 14, 2005 attacks. Admittedly, substantial grounds exist to challenge this contention.

8

First, uncertainty exists as to the legality of Resolution 1373 owing to its legislative nature.
Second, Resolution 1757’s travaux makes clear that Security Council members were not
intending to relate the two resolutions. Finally, the generalized terms of Resolution 1373’s
obligations may be too vague to enforce. But these terms overlook (1) the binding nature of
1373 and (2) the clear relation between the two resolutions.
6. The ICTY’s Tadic Decision Supports Interpretation of Resolution 1757
that Obligates Third Party Nations to Cooperate with the STL.
The 1995 Tadic Appeals Decision may play a significant role in settling the issue of third
party cooperation to the STL. Since Chapter VII tribunals have the authority to interpret their
own mandates, the STL will likely interpret the terms of Resolution 1757. The Tadic decision
looked to both (1) the related documents of the ICTY’s implementing security council resolution
and (2) the ICTY’s mandate in to interpret the jurisdictional limits of the ICTY. In Tadic, the
two elements reinforced one another. In respect to third party cooperation, the contextual
elements related to Resolution 1757 conflict. But, the STL’s mission is clear: to bring justice to
the perpetrators of the February 14, 2005 attacks. Tadic suggests that the STL Chambers may
emphasize the STL’s mission in interpreting the STL’s governing documents, thereby favoring a
decision that obligates third party nations to cooperate with the STL.
II. Background
Charged with the revolutionary mandate to prosecute those responsible for the February 14,
2005 terrorist attacks that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others,1 the

* Question Posed by the Officer of the Prosecutor, STL: How does the STL’s creation, pursuant to Chapter VII
powers of the UN SC, affect (a) the obligations, respectively, of Lebanon and third states vis-à-vis the STL; and (b)
the powers of the STL vis-à-vis Lebanon and third states? With regard to Lebanon, does the Chapter VII nature of
UN SC resolution 1757 “attach” only to the text of the resolution itself or also to some or all of the language of the
annexed documents (Agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon and Statute of the Tribunal)? For

9

STL’s establishment followed an unusual trajectory. Originally, the Lebanon sought to conclude
a treaty with the United Nations to establish the STL, similar to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.2 In fact, both Lebanon and the United Nations had signed such a treaty by February
2007.3 But domestic politics within Lebanon stalled the treaty’s ratification.4 The Security
Council responded by adopting Resolution 1757 under its Chapter VII powers, which imposed a
deadline on Lebanon to ratify the treaty, thereby establishing the STL.5 Thereafter, on June 11,
2007, since Lebanon failed to ratify the tribunal treaty in the time specified, the SecretaryGeneral began to lay the groundwork for the STL’s establishment pursuant to the Security
Council’s Chapter VII resolution.6 In the end, the Tribunal opened its doors on March 1, 2009.7

example, what is the impact of UN SC 1757 on Article 15 of the Agreement, and/or other key provisions of the
Agreement and Statute?
Choucri Sader, A Lebanese Perspective on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Hopes and Delusions, 5, 5 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 1083 (2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
1

S.C. Res. 1664, U.N. Doc S/RES/1664 ¶ 8 (Mar. 29, 2006) (stating “Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General,
and requests him to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal of an
international character…”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
2

3

See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Signs Agreement Establishing Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, U.N. Doc SG/SM/10871 (Feb. 6, 2007) (stating “[o]n 6 February 2007, the United Nations signed the
Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic regarding the Establishment of a Special
Tribunal for Lebanon) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, LEBANON: THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON ‘SELECTIVE JUSTICE’ (2009) (stating
“[t]he agreement was never ratified by the Lebanese parliament because of a deadlock between the two main
opposing political blocs, the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, over the issue, leading Lebanese Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora to request that the UN Security Council put the Tribunal into effect.”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].
4

5

S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 ¶ 1(a) (May 30, 2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

6

Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. CRIM. JUST.
1091, 1092 (2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
7

See The Special Tribunal Opens its Doors, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (March 1, 2009),
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/10/331.html (stating “[o]n March 1, 2009, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL), established to try those responsible for the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
began its operation) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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Yet critical differences, directly impacting the issue of State cooperation, separate the STL’s
governing documents from those of the ICTY and ICTR. First, the Security Council resolution
attached two governing documents, the Proposed Agreement between Lebanon and the United
Nations and an annexed Statue, to the resolution.8 Resolution 1757’s unique attachments call
into question the binding nature of these documents, clouding Lebanon’s Chapter VII obligations
to the STL. Second, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the STL’s governing documents do compel
nations to cooperate with the STL. Thus, while created through the UN Security Council’s
Chapter VII powers, it remains unclear whether the STL must conclude independent cooperation
agreements9 before requesting third party States cooperation with the Tribunal. Yet, a distinction
should be made between a general mandate to cooperate and the mechanics of such cooperation.
While the governing documents of the ICTY and ICTR compel all UN members to cooperate
with their respective tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR have concluded agreements with nations to
facilitate extradition and evidence exchange.10
Finally the precise method through which the Security Council established the STL is not
initially clear. Did the Security Council use its Chapter VII powers merely create a treaty-based
Tribunal similar to the SCSL, substituting for Lebanon’s ratification of the Agreement between
the UNSG and Lebanon? Or did Resolution 1757 establish a Chapter VII tribunal, similar to the
ICTY and ITCR?

8

See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

Bert Swart, Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1153, 1159-60
(noting that the STL must either conclude independent cooperation agreements with other nations or the Security
Council must evoke its Chapter VII powers to comply a State or States to cooperate) (2007) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
9

10

See ICTY, Member States Cooperation, http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/MemberStatesCooperation
(last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (listing all implementing agreements between the ICTY and various UN members
States) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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These theoretical questions have a direct and concrete effect on the ability of the STL to
successfully perform its mandate. Divisive domestic politics threaten to undermine Lebanese
cooperation with the STL.11 Furthermore, in light of the alleged role of third party nationals may
have played,12 the cooperation of other States may hold the key to determining and successfully
ending impunity for those perpetrators of the February 14, 2005 terrorist attacks.
III.

The Scope and Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions.

A. The Powers of Chapter VII Security Council Resolutions.
1. Charter Articles.
The UN Charter offers only a vague outline of the specific powers granted to the Security
Council. The UN Charter charges the United Security Council with the “maintenance of
international peace and security,”13 allows it to determine what constitutes a threat to
international peace,14 and permits the Security Council use military15 or non-military means16 to

11

Zeina Karem, Hezbollah, Syria Seek to Discredit Hariri Tribunal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 5, 2010), available at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101005/ap_on_re_mi_ea/lebanon_hariri_tribunal (stating “Hezbollah and its
ally Syria are mounting a campaign to undermine the U.N. tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri by raising doubts about the court's neutrality ahead of indictments expected to accuse members
of the Shiite militant group in the killing.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
12

Id. (stating “[s]uspicion fell on neighboring Syria, since Hariri had been seeking to weaken its domination of the
country. Syria has denied having any role in the murder, but the killing galvanized opposition to Damascus.”).
UN Charter art. 24(1), 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No 993 (stating “[i]n order ensure prompt and effective action by the
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Sec4urity
Council acts on their behalf.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
13

UN Charter art. 39 (stating “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
14

UN Charter art. 40 (stating “[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
15

12

accomplish these tasks. But when defining the types of possible Security Council enforcement
the UN Charter focuses on providing examples of traditional military enforcement and
embargoes.17 While there is no mention of a power to create tribunals, the Charter permits the
Security Council to establish subsidiary organs.18
While the Security Council’s powers appear wide-ranging and discretionary, the Charter
provides no wiggle room with respect to States’ obligations to the Security Council; they must
“carry out the decisions of the Security Council.”19 The Security Council’s powers are not
completely unfettered, however. The Charter enjoins the Security Council from acts that violate
the principles of the Charter,20 the “Principles of international justice and Purposes of the United
Nations,”21 and “the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”22 Hence, only clear

apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
UN Charter art. 1 (stating “[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
16

17

Id.

UN Charter at art. 29 (stating “[t]he Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary
for the performance of its functions.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
18

UN Charter art. 25 (stating “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
19

UN Charter art. 2(5) (stating “[a]ll Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the present Charter…”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
20

21

UN Charter at art. 24 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

UN Charter at art. 1(1) (stating that the UN will act “in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law…”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
22

13

violations of customary international or the UN Charter would trigger a breach of the UNSC
enforcement powers.
While the Charter suggests an outer limit to Security Council action, the Charter offers “no
express power of judicial review” of Security Council resolutions by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) or other international chambers.23 Though the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has analyzed and interpreted Security Council resolutions, in a variety of cases it has avoided
opining on the legitimacy of Chapter VII resolutions.24 Additionally, while the chambers of the
ICTY and the ICTR have reviewed their powers under their implementing Chapter VII
resolutions, they have, perhaps unsurprisingly, affirmed the authority of the Security Council to
create ad hoc international criminal tribunals.25
2. The International Court of Justice Decisions and the Powers of Security
Council.
In the Nambia decision, the ICJ affirmed the Security Council’s wide-ranging authority
to place obligations on States. Violating a general assembly and Security Council resolution,
South Africa maintained a military presence in Nambia.26 As a result, the Security Council
called on UN member States to suspend diplomatic relations with South Africa in Resolution
276.27 The UN Secretary-General then sought the ICJ’s view on what obligations the resolution

Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for
Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 No. 5 EJIL Vo. 17 881, 912 (2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
22].
23

Id. (stating “[t]his has not hampered the Court from exercising, at least incidentally , its judicial scrutiny over the
acts of other UN organs. At times this has been done more or less explicitly, at other times the ICJ has acted
somewhat surreptitiously…[when] upholding the legitimacy of resolutions of either the GA or the SC.”
24

25

Id. (citing Prosectuor v. Tadic, Case No.IT-94-I-AR, (Oct., 2 1995).

26

S.C. Res. 276 ¶ 2, U.N. Doc S/9616 (Jan. 30, 1970) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

27

Id. at ¶¶ 2-4.
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imposed member States.28 To answer this question, the ICJ first addressed the powers Security
Council. In upholding the legality of Resolution 267,29 the ICJ recognized that the Security
Council held “general powers”:
“As to the legal basis of the resolution, Article 24 of the Charter vests in the
Security Council the necessary authority to take action such as that taken in the present
case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to specific powers of the Security
Council under certain chapter of the Charter does not exclude the existence of general
powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1.”30
Thus, the ICJ upheld the Security Council’s authority to impose obligations on UN members
beyond the UN Charter’s specific enumeration of Security Council powers.31 The Court only
imposed one limit on the Security Council’s “general powers”: they must conform to the
principles and purposes of the UN, listed in Charter Articles 1 and 2.32 Hence, the Court
obligated to the Security Council to act in “conformity with the principles of justice and
international law.”33
The ICJ reaffirmed the Security Council’s general powers in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons
decision. The Court accessed whether the World Health Organization (WHO), a subsidiary

28

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Reports, Adv. Op. (June 21, 1971) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
29

Id. at page 54, ¶ 116.

30

Id. at page 52, ¶ 110.

31

See DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN
CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 29-30 (2001) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
32

Nambia, supra note 28, at 52, ¶ 100 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

33

UN Charter, supra note 22, at art. 1(1) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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organ of the UN, had authority to address the legality of nuclear weapons use.34 In rejecting the
WHO’s ability to access the legality of nuclear weapons use,35 the ICJ discussed the implied
powers of international organizations:
The powers conferred on international organizations are normally the subject of an
express statement in their constituent instruments. Nevertheless, the necessities of
international life may point to the need for organizations, in order to achieve their
objectives, to possess subsidiary powers which are not expressly provided for in the basis
instruments that govern their activities. It is generally accepted that international
organizations can exercise such powers, known as “implied” powers.36
While using the term “implied powers,” the ICJ reaffirmed the ability of international
organizations, like the Security Council, to exercise powers not superficially enumerated in their
governing documents.
In both Nambia and, more recently, in The Nuclear Weapons Case, the ICJ has
reaffirmed the wide-ranging scope of Security Council powers.
3. Past Practices of the UN Security Council.
Finally, past Chapter VII resolutions aid in accessing the scope of the Security Council
powers. But the range of Chapter VII powers has expanded quickly, and with controversy,37
since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War era, reflecting the divisive geo-politics of the time,

34

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 68, ¶ 1, Adv. Op., I.C.J. Rep. (July 1996) (restating the
question submitted to the ICJ by the U.N. Secretary-General) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
35

Id. at 79, ¶ 25.

36

Id. at 78, ¶ 25.

See Bjorn Elberling, The Ultra Vires Character of Legislative Actions by the Security Council, 2 INT’L ORG. L.
REV. 337 (2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
37

16

limited the exercise of Chapter VII powers.38 But in the post-Cold War era, the Security Council
has exercised its powers far more muscularly39 and far more often.40 But its powers, while
apparently self-prescribed, still must conform to principles of international law and retain the
confidence of UN member states.41
B. Interpreting of Security Council Resolutions
Four sources aid in the interpretation of Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, such as
Resolution 1757. First, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), which
represents the codified customary international of interpreting treaty text, provides tools that can
be applied to Security Council resolutions. Second, though not vested with judicial review of
Security Council decisions, the ICJ’s Nambia decision offers its own interpretive guidelines.
Third, the Tadic case offers a very relevant instance of an international tribunal interpreting its

38

Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. OF
INT’L L. 593, 594 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
39

See TAE JIN KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HANDLING OF LEGAL
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND SITUATIONS 32-39 and 77-80 (1964) (noting Members’
disagreements over whether the Security Council could act in response to situations in Spain and Palestine)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]; See BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND
THE RIGHT OF VETO 212-13 (stating “[t]he comprehensive task of safeguarding world peace, which was assigned to
the Security Council, does not support an opinion according to which the Council, as a mere ‘policeman’ of the
international community is only entitled to fight aggression and put an end to imminent threats to international peace
and security. That the Council itself has adopted a broader view was vividly demonstrated by its various measures
in the context of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, as well as by its establishing the War Crimes Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994. ”) (1998) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
40

Patrick Johansson, The Humdrum Use of Ultimate Authority: Defining and Analysing Chapter VII Resolutions, 78
Nordic J. of Int’l L. 309, 326-327 (2009) (stating “The Security Council adopted 477 Chapter VII resolutions from
1946 through 2008…Of the 477 Chapter Resolutions, 21 were adopted during the Cold War and 456 have been
adopted since it ended.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for
Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 No. 5 EJIL Vo. 17 881, 917 (2006) (stating “[i]n a self-contained, treaty-based system
like the UN Charter that ultimately hinges on Members States’ consent…”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 22].
41
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own Chapter VII governing documents. And finally, international law scholars provide other
guidelines to interpreting Security Council Resolutions.
Three key guidelines for interpreting Chapter VII resolutions emerge from these sources: (1)
adopt the plain meaning of the terms as they are understood by the Security Council, and (2)
interpret the resolution consistent with the Security Council members’ purpose and aim. But,
unlike typical treaty interpretation, (3) travaux and other documents related to the negotiations
and drafting record play a primary role in interpreting Chapter VII resolutions. Finally, it should
be noted that international tribunals, themselves, will resolve opposing interpretations of its
governing documents without deferral to the Security Council or other international bodies.42
1. Principles of Treaty Interpretation Codified by the Vienna Convention on the
Legality of Treaties.
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT lay out the codified customary law of treaty
interpretation, though it should be noted that this treaty only applies to agreements between
States. While not treaties, Security Council resolutions, adopted through a majority vote of the
Security Council when not vetoed by a permanent member, are analogous to multilateral treaties.
Article 31 lays down the first tool of treaty interpretation: examine “the ordinary meaning” of
resolution’s text, within the object and purpose of the resolution.43 Article 31(2)44 expands the
text to include other agreements between the parties relating to the agreement, and any
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Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Appeals Chamber Decision on the Tadic Jurisdictional Motion ¶¶ 19-20, Case No. IT94-1-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995) (concluding that the Court had the power to review its own jurisdictional powers and
giving itself the power to review Security Council Resolutions.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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Vienna Convection on the Law of Treaties art. 31, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 91212, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
44

Id. at art. 31(2).
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agreements related to the conclusion of the agreement. Article 31(3)45 then permits subsequent
agreements, practices or applicable principles of international law to guide in the interpretation
of agreements. Finally, if these precepts create (1) a “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result
or (2) an “ambiguous or obscure” meaning, Article 3246 permits parties to look to preparatory
work to interpret the Agreement. Therefore, the negotiating record is a subsidiary, rather than
primary vehicle for treaty interpretation. As discussed below, such an approach should not be
adopted when interpreting Security Council resolutions.
2. The Nambia Decision.
While offering limited guidance, the ICJ suggests that the VCLT should not control the
interpretation of Security Council resolutions. Sir Michael C. Wood, former legal assistant at the
Foreign Commonwealth Office and currently a Senior Fellow for International Law at
Cambridge University,47 considers the ICJ’s Nambia decision to be the Court’s only substantial
guidance on interpreting Security Council resolutions.48 Wood emphasizes the Nambia
decision’s brief interpretive discussion:
The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before
a conclusion can be made to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under
Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in
each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in generally, all circumstances that

45

Id. at art. 31(3).

46

VCLT art. 32 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW, M.C. Wood Biography
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/notewriters/wood.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (providing a biography of
Michael C. Wood) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
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M.C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS
LAW (1998) 73, 76 (stating “SCRs have of course been considered in other cases before the International Court, but
in no other case has it explained its approach to interpretation.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security
Council.49
Wood cautions that the language above related to specific resolutions and not Security Council
resolutions in general,50 but still emphasizes that the ICJ did not look to the VCLT.51 But this
seems to be an understatement of the ICJ’s ruling. The Court explicitly states that resolution’s
related discussions and circumstances should be used as primary tools of interpretation. Such an
approach directly comes into conflict with the VCLT, which relegates preparatory work to a
secondary tool of treaty interpretation. Therefore, the Nambia decision strongly suggests that
simply applying VCLT principles fails to properly interpret Security Council resolutions.
3. The Tadic Decision.
In Tadic, the ICTY held itself competent to interpret its Chapter VII-established Statute
when determining the ICTY’s jurisdiction. In accessing the scope of and legality of its Statute,
the Court interpreted the Statute through a literal reading,52 and then through a “teleological”
approach that focused on the aims and purposes.53 To determine the aims and purposes of the
Statute, the Court analyzed resolutions leading up to the creation of the ICTY, the SecretaryGeneral’s report on the Statute, and Security Council member statements interpreting the ICTY’s

49

Nambia, supra note 28, at 53, ¶ 114 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

See Wood at 75 (stating “the Court was not necessarily making a general statement about the interpretation of
SCRs, but was dealing with the question whether particular SCRs had binding effect.”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
50

Id. (stating “[t]he Court did not here refer to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted some two
years earlier, though in other decisions—when considering treaties—it did rely upon that Convention’s rules on
interpretation as reflecting the rules of customary international law, as did other international tribunals.”).
51
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See Tadic, supra note 42, at ¶ 71 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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Id. at ¶¶ 72-79.
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Statute at the time of its adoption.54 Not only did the Court veer away from using the VCLT to
interpret its Resolution 827,55 it delegated upon itself the power to interpret a Chapter VII
Security Council resolution to determine the extent of its own mandate.56 The ICJ decision
suggests that a more comprehensive framework than that offered by the VLCT is required to
properly interpret Security Council resolutions.
The Appeals Chamber also stressed the purpose of Resolution 827 when interpreting the
ICTY’s jurisdictional boundaries. In Tadic, the Court states “the Security Council established
the International Tribunal with the stated purpose of bringing to justice persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, thereby deterring
future violations and contributing to the re-establishment of peace and security in the region.”57
The Court identifies this clearly stated mission as evidence that Security Council did not wish to
limit the ICTY’s jurisdiction to war crimes within international conflicts.58 But, significantly,
the Court held that the ICTY’s purpose conforms to the context of the resolution, i.e. the
resolution’s associated resolutions, documents, and Security Council member statements.
Hence, the Court found two compelling arguments for a more expansive view of the ICTY’s
jurisdiction.

54

Id. at ¶ 86-87.

55

See id.; (Student) Efthymios Paptravidris, Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII in the
Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis 83, 91-92 ICLQ 56 (Jan. 2007) (stating “The Appeals Chamber…made no reference to
the VCLT, which is more than telling in this regard.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
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See Tadic, supra note 42, at ¶ 19 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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Id. at ¶ 72.

Id. at ¶ 74 (stating that “[t]he Security Council was clearly preoccupied with bringing to justice those responsible
for these specifically condemned acts, regardless of context.”).
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A significant possibility arises when different circumstances are applied the contextpurpose analysis of Tadic. For example, how would the outcome in Tadic change if the clear
purpose of Resolution 827 had to be weighed against conflicting contextual elements?
Admittedly, no conclusive answer to this hypothetical can be given. But Tadic raises the
possibility that a Chapter VII tribunal resolve an ambiguity by elevating their Statute’s clear
purpose over conflicting contextual evidence. This may prove significant to determining
whether third party States are obligated to cooperate with the STL, and will be discussed further
in Section IV(C)(2).
4. A Proposed Framework for Interpreting Security Council Resolutions
Efthymios Paptravidris, analyzing the interpretive sources described above, proposes a
specific interpretative framework for Security Council Resolutions.59 Using VLCT Articles 31
and 31 and 32 as a starting point,60 Papatravdris states that the plain and ordinary meanings of a
resolution’s terms as the Security Council members understand them should be the first tool in
interpretation.61 Second, he expands the context elements of Article 31(2) to include associated
instruments, preambles, and annexes of a Security Council resolution.62 Third, the “object and
purpose” of the resolution should be consulted, which may refer both to the intent of the Security
Council members who voted on the resolution and the Security Council’s duty to “preserve
international peace and security.”63 Significantly this approach elevates travaux from a secondary
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See Paptravidris, supra note 55, at 99-101 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
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Id. at 100 (stating that while applying the principles of the VCLT to Security Council Reoslution either by rule or
by analogy “should not be endorsed,” they “provid[e] the counter-paradigm against which the relevant principles
and presumptions will be assessed.”).
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Id. at 101.
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Id. at 101-02.
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Id. at 103.
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tool of interpretation,64 only resorted to when results are “ambiguous” or “manifestly absurd,”65
to a primary source for discerning the object and purpose of a Security Council resolution.
Furthermore, Paptravidris’s interpretive framework applies three presumptions to guide the
interpretation of Security Council resolutions. First, a resolution should be (1) interpreted
strictly, meaning “there should be no additional burdens presumed for sovereign States except for these
explicitly stated in the pertinent Resolution.”66 Second, any interpretation must not violate (2) jus

cogens and (3) principles of the UN Charter.67
This memorandum will adopt Paptravidris’ approach to Security Council resolutions, as it
offers a clear encapsulation of relevant methods by which to interpret Chapter VII Security
Council Resolutions. But, it should be noted, Paptravdris’ approach requires one to accept that
the Security Council may place general,68 as well as situation-specific,69 obligations on States.
Such resolutions, often considered legislative in that they place indeterminate and general
obligations on states, are considered illegitimate by some international law scholars.70 While this
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Id. at 104.

65

VCLT at art. 32 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Paptravidris, supra note 53, at 110 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
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Id.

Paptravidris at 102 (stating “it (the object and purpose of the resolution) attains incremental importance in the
context of interpretation of constituent instruments of international organizations and, of course in the realm of our
enquiry, with regard to the interpretation of ‘legislative’ or ‘generic’ Resolutions of the Security Council…”), refer
to note 53.
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See UN Charter art. 39 (the article’s text suggests that a breach to the peace must be a specific event that results in
the Security Council crafting situation-specific obligations “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
69

Bjorn Elberling, The Ultra Vires Character of Legislative Actions by the Security Council, 2 INT’L ORG. L. REV.
337, 360 (2005) (stating “[t]he discharge of legislative powers by the Security Council violates the UN Charter.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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controversy does not impact Section IV’s interpretation of Resolution 1757, it will be
particularly relevant to the issue of third party cooperation with the STL discussed in Section V.
Though not uncontroversial, applying Paptravidris’ approach provides a well-defined framework
that permits a thorough analysis States’ obligations to the STL under Resolution 1757.
IV.

Interpreting Resolution 1757 and its Attached Documents

A. The Security Council Established a Chapter VII International Tribunal by
Adopting Resolution 1757.
The exact nature of Resolution 1757’s Chapter VII powers is not explicitly defined
within the resolution, the resolution’s text, or clear from the resolution’s purpose and aim.
While these sources substantiate the Security Council’s intent to create the STL,71 this does not
answer how the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers actually brought about the tribunal’s
creation. Indeed, two competing theories explain the STL’s creation.72 One theory views
Resolution 1757 as substituting for Lebanon’s ratification on the Agreement establishing the
STL.73 Resolution 1757 would thereby establish a tribunal similar to the SCSL. Alternatively,
the Security Council could have directly created the STL through Resolution 1757 through its
Chapter VII powers, placing the STL within the same company as the ICTY and ICTR.74
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S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc S/RES/1757 ¶1(a) (May 30, 2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 210.
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See Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. CRIM.
JUST. 1091, 1096-97 (2007) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
Id. at 1096 (stating “whether, by its decision, the Council intended to bring into force the Agreement…in its
quality as an international treaty between the United Nations and Lebanon. In this case, the Council could be said to
have substituted a binding decision made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the missing ratification of the
Agreement by Lebanon.”).
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Id. at 1097.
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Under the first theory, Resolution 1757 in effect compelled75 Lebanon to sign onto the
Agreement that created the STL as a treaty-based Tribunal. Such a view follows the clear intent
of Resolution 1757, as evidenced through 1757’s perambulatory clauses and travaux: the
Security Council wanted Lebanon to conclude an Agreement with the United Nations that
established the STL.76 This suggests Resolution 1757 acted as a substitute for Lebanon’s
missing ratification of the annexed Agreement. Hence, the Security Council used its Chapter VII
powers in a limited fashion: merely establishing a Chapter VII tribunal through the resolution’s
text, thereby creating a treaty-based international tribunal.
Admittedly, ratification-substitute view of Resolution 1757, while an apparent act of
coercion on the part of the Security Council, appears to conform to the VLCT. The VCLT
contains two provisions that bar the use of certain types of coercion in concluding treaties.77
And Resolution 1757 does not violate either of these VCLT prohibitions. First, Article 51 voids
agreements “which have been procured by the coercion of the representative of that
State…through acts or threats directed” against the coerced party.78 While one may consider
SCR 1757, which imposed a deadline on Lebanon to establish an international tribunal, Article
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Id. at 1096.
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See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, delivered to the Security Council ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) (recommending that the
Council explicitly compel third party nations to cooperate with the STL) [[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 12].; See S.C. 5658th mtg. (provisional) at 5, UN Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 2007) (highlighting the focus of
Security Council members on (1) whether terrorism constituted a valid international crime and (2) if the Security
Council could compel Lebanon to conclude a treaty without ratification during Resolution 1757’s adoption)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
77

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) Arts. 51-52, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 92-12, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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Id. at art. 51.
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51 only covers acts or threats to the representative personally, such as threat to the
representative’s family or reputation.79
Second, VCLT Article 52 prohibits the “threat or use of armed force in violation of the
principles of international law.”80 Applied to Security Council resolutions, Article 52 prohibits
the United Nations from concluding a treaty through a threat or an exercise of armed force that
violates with the UN Charter. Hence, two questions must be answered: (1) does threatening a
country violate the UN Charter and (2) does placing a deadline on Lebanon to ratify a treaty
constitute a threat under the VLCT? In regards to the first question, viewing Security Council
resolutions as threats misrepresents the role of the Security Council. The Security Council does
not coerce countries against their will, but rather ensures member states uphold their obligations
under customary and positive international law. Second, even if one views Resolution 1757 as
an act of coercion, it does not meet the threshold required by the VCLT.81 The International Law
Commission, analyzing Article 52 of the VCLT, stated “the threshold necessary to assume a
‘threat or use of force’ is not reached” if the resolution merely “assists” a nation to fulfill
domestic and international obligations.82 Resolution 1757, through its Chapter VII powers,
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Fassbender, supra note 72, at 1103 n. 45 (citing Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 Vol. II.
246, stating “[t]his phrase [“through acts or threats directed against him personally”] is intended to cover any form
of constraint of or threat against a representative affecting him as an individual and not as an organ of his State. It
would therefore include not only a threat to his person, but a threat to ruin his career by exposing a private
indiscretion, as also a threat to injury a member of the representative’s family with a view to coercing the
representative.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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VCLT art. 52 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

Fassbender, supra note 72, at 1103 (citing Yearbook of the Int’l L. Comm’n, 1982, Vol. II. 55.) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Id. (stating “the threshold necessary to assume a ‘threat or use of force’ is not reached if the only disadvantage
which is the object of the thereat is the entry into force of a treaty, negotiated with and signed by the government of
the respective state, which does not provide for a burden such as a loss of territory, or a grave economic
disadvantage, but rather assists the government of the country in question in meeting its obligations under domestic
and international law.”).
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placed an international obligation on Lebanon to ratify the treaty creating the STL. The
deadline, arguably an exercise of force, represented a tool through which the Security Council
sought to assist Lebanon to fulfill this international obligation. Hence, Resolution 1757 does not
violate either VLCT provision related to coercion.
But the VLCT also requires that parties consent to treaties, and Resolution 1757 fails to
satisfy this requirement of customary international law. VCLT Article 2(1) requires a treaty to
be approved by consenting parties.83 While the VCLT does not define consent, individual states,
including Lebanon, provide detailed ratification processes that signify their consent to a treaty.
For Lebanon, treaty consent is signified by (1) the executive branch negotiating a treaty and (2)
the Parliament approving the treaty.84 Since the Lebanese parliament never ratified the
Agreement, Lebanon never consented to Resolution 1757’s annexed Agreement. While the
Security Council has wide discretion in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers, the Council
cannot violate “principles of justice and international law.”85 Since the VCLT represents codified
principles of international law, Security Council actions must conform to the VCLT. Even if
Council members intended to substitute Lebanon’s ratification of the annexed Agreement with
their Chapter VII powers, such an act violates Article 2(1) of the VCLT. Hence, a theory that
considers the STL a treaty-based international tribunal violates international law.
VCLT art. 2(1)(a) (stating that treaty “means an international agreement concluded between States…); VCLT art.
2(1)(b) (stating “the international act so named whereby a State establishes…its consent to be bound by a
treaty…”(emphasis added)) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
83
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Constitution, art. 52 (1926) (Lebanon) (stating “[t]he President of the Republic negotiates international treaties in
coordination with the Prime Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified except after agreement of the
Council of Ministers. They are to be made known to the Chamber whenever the national interest and security of the
state permit. However, treaties involving the finances of the state, commercial treaties, and in general treaties that
cannot be renounced every year are not considered ratified until they have been approved by the Chamber.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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UN Charter, supra note 13, at art. 1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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But this does suggest the Security Council was without means to establish the STL. The
Security Council can directly establish international tribunals through its Chapter VII powers, as
it did with the ICTY86 and ICTR.87 Indeed, this practice “is well established.”88
Admittedly, there’s ample evidence to claim Security Council members intended
Resolution 1757 to take the place of Lebanon’s ratification of a treaty to create the STL. And this
intention violates international law, suggesting the STL is illegitimate. But the ICTY has held
that Security Council actions enjoy a strong presumption of legality.89 Admittedly, viewing the
STL as a treaty-based tribunal appears loyal to Resolution 1747 travaux, 90 but Resolution 1757’s
text does not explicitly state such an intent. Furthermore, viewing the STL as a Chapter VII
international tribunal conforms to the Security Council’s mandate and the text of Resolution
1757. Therefore, Resolution 1757 must be interpreted as establishing the STL as a Chapter VII
tribunal.
B. The Chapter VII Nature of Resolution 1757 Carries Over to the Annexed
Agreement and Attached Statue.
If Resolution 1757 created Chapter VII international tribunal, what legal significance should
be given to the resolution’s “annexed” Agreement and “attached” Statute? If the Chapter VII
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S.C. Res. 827, UN Doc of S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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S.C Res. 955, UN Doc S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

Fassbender, supra note 72, at 1097 (stating “[t]oday it is well established that the Council is entitled to establish
international criminal jurisdictions having the power to prosecute individual persons.”).
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Appeals Judgment ¶ 287, Case No. IT-94-1-A 128 (Jul 15, 1999) (stating “it must be
presumed that the Security Council, where it did not explicitly or implicitly depart from general rules of
international law, intended to remain within the confines of such rules.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 18].
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See S.C. 5658th mtg. (provisional) at 5, UN Doc. S/PV.5685 (May, 30 2007) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].
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authority of Resolution 1757 only runs through the resolution’s text, the terms of either
attachment would not constitute Chapter VII obligations.
Admittedly, a key formatting difference exists between Resolution 1757 and Security
Council Resolution 827 that established the ICTY. Whereas Resolutions 827 includes only an
annexed Statue, Resolution 1757 has two attached documents: (1) an annexed Agreement and
(2) an attached Agreement. But the resolutions respective texts, not their formatting should be
followed when accessing the legal nature of their attached documents. The text of Resolution
827 makes clear that the Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, adopts the
annexed Statute. Likewise, Resolution 1757 states, in the event that Lebanon does not conclude
a treaty establishing the STL, “[t]he provisions of the annexed documents, including its
attachment…shall enter into force” on June 10, 2007.91 This text shows that the Security
Council exercised its Chapter VII powers not only through Resolution 1757’s text, but
Resolution 1757’s attachments as well. Hence, the obligations within the annexed Agreement
and attached Statute represent binding Chapter VII obligations. 92
C. The Obligation of States to Cooperate with the STL Under Resolution 1757.
1. The Annexed Agreement Mandates Lebanese Cooperation with the
Tribunal.
Article 15 of the Annexed Agreement obligates Lebanon to cooperate with the STL.
First, as discussed above, the terms of the Annexed Agreement constitute binding Chapter VII
obligations. Second, Article 15 mandates Lebanon to obey requests or orders by the STL’s
91

S.C. Res. 1757 at 1(a) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

Bert Swart, Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1153, 1154 (2007)
(stating “t[he fact that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, found it necessary to
decide on the entry into force of the Agreement might perhaps mean that the obligations arising out of the
Agreement for Lebanon have themselves became obligations under Chapter VII of the Charter.”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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chambers, and cooperate with the defense and prosecution counsel.93 Hence, Lebanon’s
cooperative obligation follows the plain reading of the annexed Agreement.
Yet there’s a significant textual difference between the Chapter VII resolution creating
the STL and the resolutions that created the ICTY and ICTR. While all three resolutions
mandate cooperation within their Statutes, the ICTY and ICTR reiterates this binding decision
within the text of the resolution itself. As stated above, Resolution 1757 omits any discussion on
the obligations owed by Lebanon or other countries to cooperate with the STL.
While Resolution 1757 omits language on cooperation, accepted tools of Security
Council resolution interpretation obligate Lebanon to cooperate with the STL. First, as discussed
above, while the cooperation obligation is only stated in the annex, the annex was “entered into
force” by Resolution 1757.94 Therefore, similar to the ICTY and ICTR, the Chapter VII
enforcement powers carry over into the annexed documents. Furthermore, any interpretation
that eliminates Lebanon’s obligation to cooperate would (1) violate the purposes and aims of the
resolution and (2) impose an absurd result upon the Security Council’s actions. First without
mandating cooperation from Lebanon, the Court’s mandate would be impossible to carry out
given the political dynamics in Lebanon now, and most importantly, at the time the resolution
was adopted. Resolution 1757, its precursors, and 1757’s travaux make clear95 the intent of the
Security Council to assist Lebanon is prosecuting those responsible for the terrorist attacks of
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Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757 at 9 (stating “[t]he (Lebanese) Government shall cooperate with all organs of the Special
Tribunal…”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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S.C. Res. 1757 1(a) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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See S.C. 5658th mtg. (provisional) at 5, UN Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 2007) (noting that all co-sponsors of
Resolution 1757 to bring justice to those responsible for the attacks of February 14, 2005.) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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February 14, 2005. Facing a deadlocked Parliament,96 the Security Council assisted by
mandating the creation of a special tribunal that requires cooperation to succeed.
Furthermore, any argument against Lebanon’s obligation to cooperate with the STL
suggests that the STL operates only with Lebanon’s consent. Such a position assumes the STL
represents at treaty-based tribunal, a position that has been refuted in Section IV(A) above.
Therefore, Resolution 1757 obligates Lebanon to cooperate with the STL. In fact, “there is an
all-compassing and unconditional obligation for Lebanon to cooperate with the STL.”97
2. Resolution 1757 Nor Its Attached Documents Mandate Nations Other Than
Lebanon to Cooperate with the Tribunal
Unlike the analysis of Lebanon’s obligations towards the STL, third party cooperation
finds little support in Resolution 1757’s text, attached documents or travaux. Whereas the STL
has been charged to find those responsible for terrorist attacks of February 15, 2005, Resolution
1757’s perambulatory language explicitly links the resolution with efforts to negotiate a the
creation of a tribunal with Lebanon. While this agreement may never have been successfully
concluded, it suggests that the Security Council sought to obligate only Lebanon through
Resolution 1757 and its attached documents. By only mandating Lebanon to cooperate with the
STL, the Security Council may have hampered the STL ability to bring to prosecute the

See Bardo Fassbender, supra note 72, at 1093-94 (stating “the Council, in fact sided politically with the Lebanese
Government, which had many times declared that it wished to see the Special Tribunal installed at the earliest
possible time, notwithstanding the objections of Parliament or at least a significant part of its membership.”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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perpetrators of the February 2005 terrorist attack. But Security Council is not obligated to
establish all Chapter VII tribunals with uniform powers nor seek comprehensive justice.98
One could argue that all Chapter VII resolutions are binding on all members states and,
therefore, that Lebanon’s duty to cooperate carries to all UN member States. Admittedly the UN
Charter mandates UN member states to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter.”99 But such an argument, based solely on
Resolution 1757 and its supporting documents, violates a plain reading of the Charter. First, the
tribunal made no “decision” as to the third party cooperation. Second, Security Council
obligations must flow from their resolutions text, aims, and purposes, and then be weighed
against the sovereignty of UN members.100 In Resolution 1757, the Security Council specifically
limits the sovereign rights of Lebanon by obligating Lebanon to cooperate with the STL.
Imputing the same obligations onto other nations without a similarly clear resolution violates
sovereign equality. Therefore, third party nations appear to fulfill their obligations to the STL as
long as they refrain from actively undermining the STL.
Finally, the travaux of Resolution 1757 suggests that third party obligations were
purposively omitted by the Security Council. Before adopting Resolution 1757, the SecretaryGeneral presented to the Security Council a progress report on negotiations with Lebanon to
create the STL. Within the report, the Secretary-General explicitly suggested that the Security
See Nambia, supra note 28, at 55, ¶ 120 (stating “[t]he precise determination of the acts permitted or allowed—
what measures are available and practicable, which of them should be selected, what scope they should be given and
by whom they should be applied—is a matter which lies within the competence of the appropriate political organs of
the United Naitons acting within their authority under the Charter.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
15].
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UN Charter art. 2(1) (stating “[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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Council consider obligating all UN members to cooperate with the tribunal.101 Admittedly, the
statements of Security Council members at the time of Resolution 1757’s adoption failed to
address third party cooperation.102 But by omitting the Secretary-General’s recommended
language, it appears clear that the drafters of Resolution 1757 deliberately decided against
obligating third party nations to cooperate with the STL.
V.

Interpreting Resolution 1757 in Conjunctions With Resolution 1373 Obligates
Third Party Nations to Cooperate with the STL.

A strong case can be made, however, that Resolution 1757, when viewed in conjunction with
the Chapter VII Security Council Resolution 1373, obligates all States to cooperate with the
STL. Resolution 1373, adopted in 2001, imposes general obligations on member States relating
to international terrorism. Three issues are discussed to conclude that Resolution 1373 obligates
all member States cooperate with the STL. First, while Resolution 1373’s legislative nature
raises doubts among some scholars as to its legitimacy, Resolution 1373 still constitutes a
binding Chapter VII resolution. Second, Resolution 1757 particularizes Resolution 1373’s
obligation that States bring perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice, which requires third party
States to cooperate with the STL. Finally, interpreting Resolution 1757 in conjunction with
Resolution 1373 follows the interpretive guidelines laid out in Section III. Therefore, Resolution
1757, when viewed in conjunction with Resolution 1373, obligates third party nations to
cooperate with the STL.
A. The Legislative Nature of Resolution 1373.
101
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delivered to the Security Council, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 12].
102

See S.C. 5658th mtg. (provisional) at 5, UN Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 2007) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].

33

Resolution 1373,103 adopted less than three weeks after the attacks of September 11th, 2001
represented a significant change to the traditional scope of Chapter VII Security Council
resolutions. 104 First, it did not seek to respond to a concrete situation endangering international
peace and security, but to combat international terrorism more generally.105 Whereas in the past,
the extent and duration of the Council’s binding decisions were limited to a specific event or
series of events. Second from this nebulous situation, the Security Council imposed general
obligations on all member states.106 These two characteristics of the resolution have led some
commentators to consider this a legislative107 act by the Security Council that establishes new,
seemingly permanent, obligations on States.
But one must be cautious when identifying obligations within Resolution 1373 through
Resolution 1757 for two reasons. First, it has been noted that while the Security Council adopted
the resolution, it is suspected that many members of the Security Council did not consent to its
terms and have misgiving about Resolution 1373’s implementation.108 Furthermore, much
103

S.C. 1373, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

See Elberling, supra note 37, at 338 (reviewing the impact of Resolution 1373 on the Security Council’s Chapter
VII powers) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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See id. (reviewing that the Security Council determination that terrorism in the abstract as a threat to international
peace and security).
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See id. at 339 (stating “[t]hese resolutions (Resolutions 1373 and 1540] represent an unprecedented development:
The Council has started legislating for the entire international community.”), refer to note 36; see Matthew Happold,
Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 593, 600
(stating “the real issue is whether Resolution 1373 will serve as a precedent for future Security Council legislation.”)
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scholarly criticism has been directed towards resolution 1373.109 In fact, one scholar goes as far
to state “the discharge of legislative powers by the Security Council violates the UN Charter.”110
While not without its supporters,111 Resolution 1373’s authority rests on shaky ground.
Yet, Resolution 1373 still constitutes a Chapter VII resolution adopted by the Security
Council. Therefore whatever its flaws, it still possesses binding authority. Furthermore, if a
subsequent Security Council resolution defines and particularizes a Resolution 1373 obligation,
the concerns discussed above become moot.
B. Resolution 1373 Obligates States to Cooperate with the STL
1. Resolutions 1757 and 1373 Impose an Obligation on Third Party States to
Cooperate with the STL.
Resolution 1373 contains two relevant provisions that relate back to the STL. Resolution
1373(2) specifically obligates States to:
(d) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation
or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and
secure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are
established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including
assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;112
Happold, supra note 107, at 607 (stating “[r]esolution 1373 purports to create a series of general and temporally
undefined obligations binding the member states. In this it goes beyond the limits of the Security Council’s
powers.”), refer to note 101; Bjorn Elberling at 348 (stating “[o]ne may question whether the Council is suitable for
the exercise of legislative functions….First, the Council, is not a very transparent organ, as shown by the process
leading to the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which consisted largely of secret negotiations among the
permanent members.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
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Taken together these sections place an affirmative duty on States to (1) bring justice to
those responsible for terrorist acts and (2) afford each other assistance in criminal proceedings
involving acts of terrorism. The STL is specifically charged to “prosecute persons responsible
for the attack of 14 February 2005” which the Security Council characterized as a “terrorist
crime.”113 As such, Resolution 1757 could activate the Chapter VII obligations contained in
Resolution 1373 and obligate third party States to cooperate with the STL.
Yet, two sets of objections must be overcome before successfully finding a Chapter VII
obligation that third party States cooperate with the STL. First, Resolution 1373’s obligations
have been portrayed as (1) failing to create any obligations regarding how States should combat
terrorism or (2) creating obligations that do not apply to the STL. Stefan Talmon, a professor of
public international law at Oxford, argues that Resolution 1373 imposes only its aims on States,
and not mandating the “ways and means of reaching these aims.”114 But, in reaching this
conclusion, the author does not address Resolution 1757, the STL, or the key language of
Resolution 1373 quotes above.115 As such, this analysis fails to consider whether Resolution
1757 represents a defined “ways and means” of combating terrorism that States are not obligated
to support. Hence, Talmon analysis does not address whether a subsequent Chapter VII Security
Council resolution can define and trigger Resolution 1373 obligations.
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Bert Swart, professor of international criminal law at the University of Amsterdam, offers
a more precise critique of applying Resolution 1373 to Resolution 1757. While finding that
Resolution 1373 does impose obligations that relate to State cooperation in cases of international
terrorism, Swart concludes that these obligations do not apply to the STL. Hence, Resolution
1757 does not trigger a third party obligation to cooperate with the STL through Resolution
1373. Swart only finds three limited ways that Resolution 1373 encourages cooperation between
States in cases of international terrorism.116 First, according to Swart, Resolution 1373 indirectly
fosters cooperation between States seeking to prosecute terrorist crimes by (1) mandating all
states criminalize terrorism and (2) prohibiting States from refusing to cooperate simply by
claiming the requesting State is motivated by political calculations.117 These two obligations
may it more likely that States will enter cooperation agreements related to investigations of
international terrorism. Second, Resolution 1373 mandates States (1) prosecute or (2) extradite
any person involved in terrorist acts, which encourages state cooperation but by no means
requires it.118

Significantly, both these incentives for cooperation cannot apply to the STL.

Swart, adopting a strict reading of Section 1(f) of Resolution 1373, argues that these obligations
only arise between States. Hence, these obligations would only become binding when (1) a State
investigates a terrorist crime and (2) requests cooperation from another State. As a non-state
actor, these obligations of Resolution 1373 cannot used by the STL.
Finally, Swart claims that even the “autonomous” cooperation obligations of Resolution
1373, i.e. obligations that do not require a State request to be activated, do not apply to the STL.
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These “autonomous” obligations include (1) the duty to freeze assets of alleged terrorists, (2)
prevent terrorist attacks, and (3) engage in information sharing.119 But, as the author clearly
states, these “autonomous” obligations do not (1) an “unconditional obligation for parties to
extradite” nor (2) apply to the relationship between States and non-State entities, like the STL.120
While these obligations are always binding on States,121 they do not relate to cooperating with
the STL or any international tribunal. Therefore, Swart’s analysis suggests that Resolution 1373
fails to obligate third party States to cooperate with the STL.
But Swart’s analysis does not present a comprehensive interpretation of Resolution 1373.
Even the author concedes that his observations do not “analyze in detail” resolution 1373.122
Swart omits any discussion of Resolution 1373’s blanket obligation on all States to bring those
responsible for terrorist acts to justice.123 Admittedly, when viewed alone, this obligation
appears too vague to form a particular obligation on a State. The resolution fails to define either
what constitutes (1) justice or (2) terrorist acts. But these difficulties are eliminated when
Resolution 1373 is viewed in conjunction with Resolution 1757.
Resolution 1757 particularizes the obligations of Resolution 1373 by giving clear
meaning to what constitutes justice and terrorist acts. Resolution 1757 perambulatory text
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UN Charter art. 25 (stating “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
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identifies the February 14, 2005 attack a terrorist act.124 Indeed, the Security Council referred to
the February 14, 2005 attack as a “terrorist” act in an operative provision of an earlier resolution
established the commission charged with assisting Lebanon to investigate the terrorist
bombing.125 Therefore, Resolution 1757 defines the attacks of February 14, 2005 as terrorist
acts. Second, Resolution defines “justice”. Resolution 1757 seeks to bring justice to “those
involved in the terrorist attack” by creating the STL. Resolution 1757 turns Resolution 1373’s
abstract mandate into a particularized obligation. Since Resolution 1373’s obligation is binding
on all States, third party States have an obligation to cooperate with the STL.
However valid critiques of Resolution 1373 may be, they do not apply to third party
cooperation towards the STL. Matthew Happold attacks the legality of Resolution 1373 because
it “create[s] a series of general and temporally undefined obligations binding the member states.” But
Resolution 1757 refines these “general and temporally undefined obligations” into particularized and
concrete obligations.

Therefore, Resolutions 1373 and 1757, when analyzed in conjunction, place an obligation
on third party States to cooperate with the STL. But, does this interpretation of Resolution 1757
conform to applicable rules of Security Council resolution interpretation?
2. The Obligation of Third Party States to Cooperate with the STL Obeys the
Rules for Interpreting Security Council Resolutions.

S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 113, at Preamble ¶ 2 (stating “[r]reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14
February 2005 terrorist bombings…”); S.C. Res. 1852, U.N. Doc S/RES/1852 (reaffirming the Security Council’s
“strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing…”; S.C. Res. Referring to the 14 February
attacks as a “terrorist bombing.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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An interpretation of Resolutions 1757 and 1373 that obligates third party States to
cooperate with the STL follows Paptravidris’ rules of interpretation discussed in Section III B(4).
First, this interpretation of 1757 does not violate the plain reading of Resolution 1757. In fact,
the interpretation attempts to gap-fill Resolution’s 1757 silence on the duties of third party States
to the STL.
Second, an obligation of third party States to cooperate with the STL does not violate the
context of either Resolution 1757 and 1373. Admittedly, the conscious omission126 of third party
cooperation from Resolution 1757 suggests the Council did not wish to obligate third party
States to cooperate with the STL. But this omission must be weighed against Resolution 1757’s
clear relation to Resolution 1373. The text of Resolution 1757 gives concrete meaning to
Resolution 1373’s mandate that all countries bring those responsible for terrorist acts to justice.
Furthermore, Resolution 1757’s perambulatory language links Resolutions 1757 and 1373.
Resolution 1757’s preamble cites Resolution 1636, a Chapter VII resolution bolstering the
investigation of the February 14, 2005 attacks by the UN-created International Independent
Investigation Commission (IIIC).127 Significantly, Resolution 1636’s preamble links a State’s
obligation to cooperate with the IICC with Resolution 1373’s obligation that States cooperate
with the proceedings and investigations of terrorist acts taken by other States. 128 Hence, it
seems clear that the 1373 obligation of cooperation in proceedings related to international
terrorism expands to those conducted by States and legitimate international bodies like the IIIC
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or the STL. Therefore, the context element clearly favors an interpretation that obligates third
party States to cooperate with the STL.
Third, the interpretation above follows the “object and purpose” element of Paptravidris’
interpretative framework that looks to (1) the intent of the Security Council Members and (2) the
duty of the Security Council to “preserve international peace and security.”129 First, as discussed
above, the intent of the drafters offers little assistance in accessing questions of third party
cooperation. When voting on the resolution, the Security Council members were not occupied
by Resolution 1373’s impact on Resolution 1757. Instead, Security Council members’ concerns
focused on (1) Chapter VII powers could create an international court that prosecuted a crime
outside the recognizes international crimes of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity,130 and (2) the legality of enforcing the annexed Agreement without Lebanon’s
consent.131 Hence, the relevant question becomes not what the Security Council members
intended, but whether obligating third States to cooperate with the STL violates the Security
Council’s duty to preserve international peace and security. An obligation that third party States
cooperate with the STL makes it more likely that the perpetrators of the February 14, 2005
attacks are brought to justice. Therefore, the obligation of third party States to cooperate with
the STL follows Papstravidris’ “object and purpose” interpretive requirement.
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Finally, interpreting Resolution 1757 in conjunction with 1373 also follows Paptravidris’
three interpretive presumptions. A finding that third party States are obligated to cooperate with
the STL does not (1) violate the principles of the UN Charter nor (2) violate jus cogens.132 And,
most significantly, the interpretation still follows Paptravidris’ presumption that resolutions be
interpreted strictly.133 Given the complicated process used to justify an obligation on third party
States to cooperate with the STL, such a claim may appear surprising. But such complication
does not result from expansively viewing the resolutions or their terms. Instead, the
complication arises from Resolution 1757’s failure to discuss third party cooperation in its text or
attached documents.134 The memorandum advocates only that Resolution 1373 obligations are
triggered by Resolution 1757 since the STL represents an international tribunal (1) established
by the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers; (2) that possesses a clearly defined and limited
mandate; and, finally, (3) prosecutes only those connected to an event the Security Council
defined as a terrorist act. Therefore, the obligation of third party States to cooperate with the
STL constitutes a narrow interpretation of Resolution 1373.
Resolution 1373 obligates States to bring perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice.
Resolution 1757 particularizes and thereby activates these obligations. Finally, interpreting
Resolutions 1757 and 1373 in conjunction follows the rules of interpretation for Security Council
resolutions. Therefore, Resolution 1757 obligates third party States to cooperate with the STL.
C. The Tadic Decision Suggests That the Chambers of the STL Will Hold that
Resolution 1757 Obligates Third Party Nations to Cooperate with the STL.
See Paptravidris, supra 129, at 110 (stating “…there should be no additional burdens presumed for sovereign
States except for these explicitly stated in the pertinent Resolution.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
27].
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Any judgment on whether Resolution 1757 obligates third party nations to cooperate with the
STL must consider how the STL chambers may address the question.

As stated in Section III

B(4), the chambers of the STL, barring a definitive statement from the Security Council, would
likely decide if third party nations are obligated to cooperate with the STL.135 In this regard, the
Tadic decision on jurisdiction136 may play an important role for two reasons. First, the case
specifically dealt with a court resolving an ambiguity within its own Chapter VII-infused
governing documents. Second, this decision may have particular resonance to the current
chambers of the STL: the STL’s current president and presiding judge,137 Judge Antonio
Cassese, also presided over the Tadic decision.138
As III B(4) discusses, the Tadic decision offers further support for interpreting Resolution
1757 in conjunction with Resolution 1373. In Tadic, the Court weighed both the (1) purpose of
the ICTY’s implementing resolution and (2) the context behind the resolution’s adoption. In
respect to the STL, Resolution 1757’s context offers conflicting evidence regarding the
obligation of third party to cooperate with the STL. And while a persuasive argument can be
made for emphasizing the contextual elements that favor third party cooperation, it admittedly
relies in establishing a clear link between Resolutions 1757 and 1373. But Resolution 1757
places a clear mandate on the STL to prosecute perpetrators of the 2005 terrorist bombing.
Hence, if third party cooperation is (1) favored by Resolution’s 1757’s purpose and (2) not
disfavored from the resolution’s context, a balancing test would favor third party cooperation.
135
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Hence, if critical to fulfilling the STL’s purpose, the Tadic decision supports an interpretation of
Resolution 1757 that obligates third party States to cooperate with the STL.
VI.

Conclusion

Resolution 1757 obligates Lebanon and third party States to cooperate with the STL. The
Security Council’s Chapter VII powers follow through the STL’s implementing resolution,
Resolution 1757, and its attached texts. A plain reading of these documents obligates Lebanon
to cooperate with the STL. Furthermore, Resolution 1757 activates the responsibility of all UN
members to bring perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice under Resolution 1373. Resolution
1757, when viewed in conjunction with Resolution 1373, thereby obligates third party States to
cooperate with the STL. Therefore, while political challenges undoubtedly lay before the
tribunal, the STL possesses the necessary legal authority to prevent Lebanon or other nations
from frustrating its mandate.
The STL represents a Chapter VII established international tribunal. While originally
intended to follow the treaty-based approach of the SCSL, Lebanon’s failure to conclude a treaty
with the UN paved the way for a full-fledged international tribunal. And like the ICTY and
ICTR, the Chapter VII powers that established the STL also carried over into Resolution 1757’s
two attached documents. As such, any obligations within these three documents constitute
binding obligations on the States they apply to.
The STL’s governing documents obligate Lebanon to cooperate with the STL. Article 15 of
the Annexed Agreement compels Lebanon to support and assist the STL. Therefore, whether or
not Lebanon consents to such assistance is irrelevant; the Chapter VII authority of the Security
Council requires Lebanon to cooperate with the STL.
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Third party nations also have a duty to cooperate with the STL, though this argument
rests on murkier foundations. Third party cooperation depends on viewing Resolutions 1757 and
1373 in conjunction. Resolution 1373 imposed a general obligation on all UN members States to
combat international terrorism and bring perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice. The Security
Council triggered these obligations through Resolution 1757 by (1) determining an act of
terrorism occurred and (2) establishing a clear venue through which justice may be reached.
Therefore, Resolution 1757 also obligates third party nations to cooperate.
Admittedly, obligating third party States to cooperate with the STL appears to run directly
against the intent of Security Council members when adopting Resolution 1757. Yet, three
factors weigh against emphasizing this circumstance. First, if the Security Council’s intent
controlled the interpretation of Resolution 1757, the STL would represent an illegal treaty-based
tribunal. Second, the Security Council failed to consider Resolution 1373 obligations when
adopting Resolution 1757. And, finally, the plain reading of both resolutions shows that
Resolution 1757 particularizes the binding obligations of Resolution 1373.
Finally, the STL, like the ICTY in Tadic, will interpret its own governing documents. As
such, the chambers of the STL, looking to reasoning of Tadic, may resolve Resolution 1757’s
conflicting context regarding third party cooperation by emphasizing the STL’s mandate to bring
justice the perpetrators of the 2005 terrorist bombing. Therefore, if third party cooperation
proves critical to the STL fulfilling its mission, the Chambers will likely interpret Resolution
1757 as obligating third party nations to cooperate with the STL.
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